2 is the most important work of political philosophy for many decades, and at its heart is an egalitarian theory of justice. So one would be forgiven for assuming that the discussion of Rawls should be at the centre of the development of contemporary theories of equality. Yet, the position is not quite like that. Rawls's theory is, indeed, taken as a fixed point in the debate; a constant source of reference and often recruited as a precursor or implicit supporter of a theorist's own views, as well as, by others, a source of error or over-simplification. Yet in terms of creating a focal point for discussion of equality it is the work first of Dworkin, 3 and then increasingly Sen , 4 rather than Rawls, which has created the springboard for the detailed work of others. 1 This paper builds on a presentation given at the University of Sheffield. I thank Fabian Freyenhagen for the suggestion that I should write it up for publication in this journal, and for comments on a draft.
he calls the 'social primary goods'; the 'all-purpose means' which are valuable whatever conception of the good an individual wishes to pursue. For Rawls these are liberty, opportunity, the powers and prerogatives of office, the social bases of self-respect, income and wealth. Yet the principle most relevant for issues of distributive justice, and hence the topic of equality, the 'difference principle' is a principle for the distribution only of wealth and income. The difference principle states that a just society is one which makes the worst off as well off as possible; i.e. that it maximizes the wealth and income of the least advantaged. It's form -that it allows inequalities if they are in the interests of the worst off -and its content -that it distributes income and wealth -are both highly significant.
To understand the current debate, however, we have to take a step further back than Rawls, to Bernard Williams' paper 'The Idea of Equality '. 6 This is a deep and subtle paper which explores many tensions and nuances within the idea of equality, and, indeed, develops themes that are constantly being re-discovered or re-invented. Yet its initial importance for the current debate relies on a couple of sentences which provoked a strong reaction from Robert Nozick. Williams sees distribution according to need as a key plank in the theory of equality and writes 'The proper ground of the distribution of health care is health need. This is a necessary truth.' 7 This may seem beyond criticism, yet Nozick replies, that if this is a necessary truth then, it seems, by parity of reasoning so should the following 'The proper ground of the distribution of barbering care is barbering need.' 8 Of course Nozick wants us to agree that this is not even a truth, never mind a necessary truth. And if that is right, then Williams example of health care does not express a necessary truth either. In the case of hair care we feel that providers of the services should have an important say in who gets to use them. Nozick's point is that the same ought to be true of health care providers. Why should they be forced to respond to need, rather than the highest bidder, or some other criteria?
Nozick's argument against Williams was one part -perhaps even a small part -of the general assault on egalitarian ideas which took place in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Yet it is highly significant. Nozick presents Williams' argument as the best argument for equality he has seen -challenging the reader to tell him of a better one -and is 6 Williams, Bernard, ' Now, whether or not this appears to be a fair critique of Williams, many will think it a grossly unfair criticism against Rawls. Rawls does not argue for flat equality, but for the difference principle, which will tolerate inequalities as long as they are in the interests of the worst off. The whole point of this is to allow incentives to make individuals more productive, for the benefit of all. Hence Rawls does not ignore the motivations of producers. However, this is only a half answer. Rawls is clear that he does not believe that the more productive have claims of natural right or desert over their production.
Laws and institutions are to be set up so that they are to the greatest benefit to the least advantaged; those who have the least income and wealth. Yet, some may think, this remains a very one-sided view. Why should it be that all that ultimately matters is the wealth and income of the least advantaged?
Dworkin and Equality of Resources
The difficulty for Rawls in this area was brought out very well indeed by Ronald Dworkin, who, in a pair of long papers at the same time, set out a response to Nozick's libertarian challenges, as well as attempting to refute a range of competing egalitarian theories.
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Dworkin can be read as raising two central challenges to Rawls. 10 The first develops Nozick's objections, and can be put like this: before devoting social resources to improving the position of those with the least income and wealth, should we not, at the very least, first investigate how they came to be in that position? Some may be badly off because they are unable to work, or unable to find work. But others may have chosen to do no work. Are they equally deserving or entitled to benefit from the work of others?
Can it be fair to tax the hard-working for the benefit of those who are equally capable of hard work, and equally talented, but choose to laze around instead? The difference principle, however, does not require answers to these questions. Hence, to put Dworkin's first argument in a nutshell, it subsidizes scroungers, or to put it less tendentiously, the deliberately under-productive. In Dworkin's view this is contrary to equality. Equality should, other things being equal, allow those who work hard to reap the rewards, while those who chose to do less should bear the consequences of their choices.
A second objection raises a new difficulty. The index of primary goods, and in particular the focus on income and wealth, ignores the fact that some people have much more expensive needs than others. In particular, people who are severely disabled, or have expensive medical requirements, may have a reasonable income, but this could be wholly inadequate to pay the expenses needed to achieve a reasonable level of wellbeing.
The natural response to the problem of expensive needs, such as those of disabled people, would be to abandon primary goods as a currency of justice, and move to assessment of well-being in terms of some form of welfare, such as happiness or preference satisfaction. However, Dworkin argues that this would be a mistake. First he unleashes a battery of objections against the coherence of a welfare measureessentially the difficulty of determining when two different people are at the same level, which of course is central to any theory of equality. But the argument that is most distinctive and has had the greatest impact, is the problem of expensive tastes. Imagine two people who have the same ordinary tastes, talents and resources, and the same ability to convert resources into welfare, however that is construed. Now one of themLouis -decides that he wants to change his tastes, and manages to develop a taste for pre-phylloxera claret and plovers' eggs, and is consequently unsatisfied with beer and hens' eggs. According to Dworkin, the theory of equality of welfare would require a transfer of resources from the person with ordinary tastes to the person with expensive tastes, in order to equalise their resources. This, he plausibly argues, is deeply counterintuitive.
The difficulties he identifies in Rawls's theory are addressed by Dworkin in a way which avoids the problem of subsidizing expensive tastes. The key insight is that a notion of responsibility can be incorporated within the theory of equality. It is possible to make people responsible for matters within some domains, but not within others. Dworkin makes a distinctive between one's ambitions -including the realm of the voluntary choices one makes -and endowments, which we can think of as including in-born talents, genetic pre-dispositions, and so on. In brief, Dworkin's theory is that while equality requires government to take steps to compensate for the bad 'brute luck' of being born with poor endowments, or unforeseeable poor luck in other aspects of life, it does not require compensation for poor 'option luck' which typically includes the results of freely made choices. Hence on Dworkin's view there is no reason to subsidise Louis, who has made his own choice to develop expensive tastes. Similarly those who choose not to work, if they are able to, will not be subsidised either, and this, in principle, overcomes the 'problem of responsibility' identified with Rawls' Difference Principle.
This, however, leaves us with the question of how to determine the appropriate level of compensation or subsidy. Here Dworkin makes the brilliant move of appealing to the idea first of insurance, and then of hypothetical insurance. His first observation is that real life insurance converts brute luck into option luck. It may be a matter of pure chance whether lightning strikes my house. But it is not a matter of pure chance if I have declined to take out an easily available insurance policy to protect myself from loss.
Dworkin's argument is that if insurance is available against a hazard, and I decide not to take out insurance, then, against a background of equality, there is no case in justice for subsidising the uninsured by taxing others who beforehand were no better off. If it were possible to insure against all brute luck then it appears that Dworkin's theory would simply require an equal distribution of resources and then allow people to make their own choices and run whichever risks they wished.
Life, though, is not so simple. Brute lucks affects us from the moment we are born. Some people are born with low talents, or, as already discussed, disabled: this was one of the problems Dworkin identifies for Rawls. But it is not possible to take out insurance against bad brute luck which has already happened. 
Basic Income
Before looking at direct responses to Dworkin, it is worth noting that not everyone accepts that the problem of responsibility is as serious as he supposes. An alternative theory suggests that each person is entitled to a payment from the state whether or not they work, or are willing to work or not. This is the theory of 'unconditional basic income', and it has several possible foundations. Philippe van Parijs 11 and Andrew Levine, 12 have defended the view essentially on the grounds of neutrality between conceptions of the good; some prefer to work, some prefer not to, and, to simplify, why should we privilege the conception of the good of one over the other? Arguments are also made that it would have various consequential advantages such as ending discrimination against part-time workers, and requiring work with poor conditions to be paid a decent wage.
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In an alternative version defended by Hillel Steiner, all human beings are joint owners of the earth and its resources. To simplify, we can imagine each of us as the owner of one share in 'Earth PLC'. Anyone who wishes to use any of the world's resources must pay a rent to do so, and this rent is returned to the shareholders as a dividend. Accordingly anyone who uses more than a per capita share of the world's resources owes more rent than he or she will get back in dividend; those who use less will get more dividend than they must pay in rent. This, of course, yields a payment for everyone, whether they act responsibly or irresponsibly, although, of course, some will pay more in rent than they receive back in dividend. 14 While I will not here pursue this option further, it is necessary to register it as a live and important line in political philosophy.
Equality of Welfare Revisited
To return to the main line, recall that Dworkin considers and rejects equality of welfare as a possible response to the problem presented by the fact that disabled people may need more resources than other people to achieve an acceptable standard of living. 
Equality, Priority and Sufficiency
A different line of criticism of the theory of equality focuses on the question of whether equality is of value in itself. A traditional argument against equality is that it requires levelling down: that if there is a choice between equality at a lower level and inequality at a higher level, then the theory demands equality, even if it makes literally every individual worse off. Although familiar, few egalitarians took this argument seriously, brushing it aside one way or another, until Rawls presented the difference principle, in which inequalities are tolerated when they are to the advantage of the worst off. This prevents levelling down, of course, which is its aim.
It was, however, unclear whether Rawls' theory should be treated as one of equality or not. On the one hand, theorists such as Nagel treated Rawls as a paradigm example of a theorist of equality, 18 and critics of equality take Rawls as their target. On the other hand it cannot be denied that Rawls' theory permits inequality, and so some more radical theorists criticised Rawls as a theorist of inequality. 19 The situation, however, has been theorists better to understand their own intuitions and theoretical commitments. For example, Arneson has moved from an equality view to one of weighted priority. 22 We will see further applications of these distinctions shortly.
Sen and Capability Theory
In parallel to Dworkin, Amartya Sen was also developing an egalitarian response to Rawls. Sen was particularly exercised by Rawls's index of well-being in terms of primary goods, and by the fact that this ignored the plight of disabled people. Sen's suggestion is that evaluation of how well an individual's life is going, from the point of view of whether they should be offered state support, should measure neither the resources someone has, or the welfare they are able to derive, but their 'capability to function'. A functioning is what a person can 'do or be': achieve nourishment, health, a decent life span, selfrespect, and so on. A person's 'capability set' is the alternative sets of functionings they are able to achieve with their resources and opportunities, and a capability, therefore is the freedom to achieve a functioning.
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This pluralist view of well-being is often regarded as a more realistic account that any theory of welfare or resources. Although Sen's theory is not set out to respond to Nozick's objections one can see, nevertheless, that it contains within it a particular theory of responsibility. If one has the capability to achieve functionings, but neglects to do so, then one is responsible for one's own situation and does not have a claim in justice against others for help. This notion of freedom and responsibility, within a theory of equality, has made the theory attractive to many.
Sen's theory has become extremely important in development economics, influencing policy within organisations such as United Nations, encouraging a move away from income measures of poverty, to 'lack of basic functioning'. 24 This has been among the contributions which won him the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1998. However, political philosophy has found it harder to incorporate Sen's theory, for two main reasons. First, Sen has always refrained from setting out a definitive list of human functionings. Second, on a pluralist view it is very hard to understand what equality means. Equality seems to require a way of measuring functionings against each other, but the essence of a pluralist view is that this is not, in general, possible. Solving the first problem, as Martha
Nussbaum has attempted to do in laying out an account of essential human functionings, 25 simply brings out the difficulty of the second.
Nevertheless, the contributions of Frankfurt and Parfit have allowed political philosophers to make better use of Sen's approach, in that a 'sufficiency view' of capabilities has appeared a more promising approach (Anderson, 1999 , Nussbaum, 2006 in which the goal of social policy is to bring each person to a threshold level of sufficiency in each capability. 26 There are, however, severe difficulties when resource constraints make this impossible. 27 The theory will need to be supplemented in some way to deal with priority setting between competing claims, and many of the initial difficulties reassert themselves. However, the position may not be completely hopeless, and it has been argued that it is possible to combine a prioritarian position with a (modified) capability view.
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Relational Equality and The Critique of Luck Egalitarianism
Alongside the revival of Sen's approach, we have also seen a set of criticisms levelled against the way in which responsibility is incorporated into the theories of Dworkin, 
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. Indeed, this theme is prominent in Bernard Williams' paper, which, we saw above, received such savage, and perhaps distracting, criticism from Nozick. 36 The central idea is that a society of equals has to create conditions of mutual respect, and self-respect and thereby overcome hierarchical divisions. This type of view has strong affinities with the work of the 'difference' theorist Iris Marion Young, 37 and 'recognition' theorist Nancy Fraser. 38 There are numerous variation on this theme, but the basic idea is an equal society is one that has the right quality of relations between individuals, rather than one which distributes the 'currency' of justice, the right way.
Even though there appears to be increasing sympathy for the idea that social equality is an indispensable part of an equal society, it is also noted that distributive elements cannot be ignored either. 39 One major current research programme is to try to work out how distributional and social understandings of equality can be combined in a single view.
Contemporary Developments
Although there is rather little published on these themes so far, there is increasing attention, evidenced through conferences on the topics, in two related topics. One starts from the observation that much recent work in political philosophy is based on 'ideal theory' or 'full compliance'. That is, its aim is to set out a theory for the just society, assuming that all citizens will follow the rules. However, there is a lurking question about the application of such theories to the real world. It may be impossible to implement a theory for many reasons; that it makes unreasonable demands of human beings; that it is not fully coherent; that there is no political will; that there is no route from where we are to where we would be, and so on. For this reason some theorists are beginning to think that greater attention to issues of 'non-ideal' theory and 'the real world' is needed, following the thought that political philosophy must start from where we are.
This programme is really seamless with another: social justice in practice, which tries to use philosophical theory to consider real social policy issues, and, in turn, modify the theory in the light of such issues. If, for example, a theory of equality suggests ways of dealing with inequality which conflict with existing progressive and enlightened social policies, it seems that, at the least, we should consider whether we have the right theory, and be prepared to revise the theory so that it can not only fit in with the best social policies, but also help determine priorities in hard cases. 40 
